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HIS Article discusses cases decided under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code as adopted in Texas (the Code) and reported since publi-
cation of last year's Texas' Survey.' Because 1998 was not a
legislative year in Texas, no amendments to the Code are discussed in this
Article. The reader should be alert to the possibility, however, that by
the time this Article is published, substantial amendments to the Code
may have been passed affecting Letters of Credit and Secured
Transactions.2
I. DEFINITIONS & GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. "CONSPICUOUS"
In Littlefield v. Schaefer,3 the Texas Supreme Court held that a release
purporting to relieve the operator of a motorcycle race from liability for
injuries suffered by riders during a race was not "conspicuous" as re-
quired by section 1.201 of the Code.4 The court described the release as
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. The Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code comprises the first eleven
chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Unless otherwise noted, all refer-
ences in this Article are to the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998).
2. With two main exceptions, the Texas version of the Code is much the same as the
Official Text of the Code as promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. These exceptions are Article 5, "Letters of Credit," U.C.C. §§ 5-101
to -117 (1995) and Article 9, "Secured Transactions," U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -708 (1998). The
revision of Article 5 approved by the National Conference of Commissioners in 1995 unex-
pectedly failed to win passage during the 1997 Texas legislative session because of a point
of order raised by Representative Wohlgemuth on May 30, 1997. See H.J. OF TEX., 75th
Leg., R.S. 3809-10 (1997). This point of order prevented consideration of some fifty-two
bills, including Article 5, and occurred too late in the session to be remedied. The revision
of Article 9 was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on July 31, 1998,
and the Texas Legislature will have its first opportunity to consider this revision in the 1999
legislative session. It is impossible to predict, of course, whether either or both revisions
will be introduced and win passage during the session, but the reader should be aware of
these possible changes affecting Texas commercial law. The full Official Text of the Article
5 and Article 9 revisions can be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners'
Web site at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm.
3. 955 S.W.2d 272, 274-75 (Tex. 1997).
4. The Code defines "conspicuous" in the following manner:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in
capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous.
Language in a body of a form is conspicuous if it is larger or other contrast-
ing type or color.
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"a six-paragraph release printed in minuscule typeface" on the front of an
entry form which used a typeface and font size that was "easily readable"
for questions that entrants were required to answer. However, the re-
lease itself was "practically illegible."'5 The court reaffirmed its prior
holding that it would apply the Code standard of conspicuousness to con-
tracts of all types regardless of whether the contracts were otherwise gov-
erned by a specific chapter of the Code and the release in question failed
to meet this standard. 6
B. "GOOD FAITH"
In Texas, as elsewhere, questions surrounding application of the doc-
trine of "good faith" have generated extensive litigation. 7 Cases reported
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Vernon 1994).
5. Littlefield, 955 S.W.2d at 273-74. A copy of the release is reprinted in the opinion,
and the court noted that it "is as legible as the copy in the court record." The headings in
the release are described as being in four-point type with 28 characters to the inch, and the
body of the release is in an even smaller type described as being 38 characters per inch.
See id. at 274. Many laser printers today will print in fonts as small as two points, and the
reader may wish to experiment with two, three, and four point sizes to get an idea of the
size of such "fly-speck" fonts.
6. See id. at 274. The court announced this application of the Code definition in
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993). In Dresser, the
court also held that whether a clause is conspicuous is a question of law for the court. See
id. at 274.
7. Although admittedly a crude measure, a Westlaw search generated the following
yearly results for Texas cases (including federal cases involving Texas law) in which the
phrase "good faith" appeared: 1980: 334, 1981: 383, 1982: 319, 1983: 305, 1984: 297, 1985:
308, 1986: 343, 1987: 341, 1988: 392, 1989: 386, 1990: 462, 1991: 449, 1992: 544, 1993: 545,
1994: 517, 1995: 499, 1996: 610, 1997: 551, 1998 (to date) 537. The total number of cases in
which the phrase appeared in cases reported since January 1 of 1980 is: 8122, an average of
427 cases per year for 19 years. Can anyone imagine doing this kind of case-counting
before the advent of computerized legal research? On the other hand, can anyone imagine
a reason to do it after the advent of computerized legal research? But see Fred R. Shapiro,
The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540 (1985), discussing his hand-
counted list of law review citations to determine the most-frequently cited law reviews.
Nonetheless, and despite the rough nature of the search, it does seem to be a fair statement
to say that the phrase "good faith" required explicit mention more frequently in recent
years than in the past. The seminal case on the subject in Texas law stating that a duty of
good faith would be imposed if there was a "special relationship" between the parties is
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983) (Spears, J., concurring) (stating that
duty of good faith arises in fiduciary relationships and in special relationships). Since that
time, several cases have addressed the question of whether the parties have such a "special
relationship." See, e.g., Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276,
280-82 (Tex. 1998) (finding no special relationship between surety and principal; principal
adequately protected by existing law and no independent duty of good faith should be
imposed); Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Presidio Engineers & Contractors., Inc., 960
S.W.2d 41, 52 (Tex. 1998) (affirming that a duty of good faith does not arise in ordinary
commercial transactions absent a special relationship); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navis-
tar Int'l Transp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992) (concluding that a relationship between
franchisor and franchisee is not a special relationship); FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706,
708-09 (Tex. 1990) (holding that no special relationship creating a duty of good faith exists
between a debtor and creditor); Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210, 212
(Tex. 1988) (applying duty of good faith to the relationship between a worker and a
worker's compensation carrier); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d




during this Survey period indicate that such questions continue to arise.
One such case is Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc.8 in which a
pipeline company entered into a contract with a processor to gather and
compress natural gas before it was resold by the pipeline company to its
customers. Due to federal deregulation of the natural gas industry, it was
no longer economical for pipeline companies to buy and resell gas since
gas customers were free to buy directly from gas producers. This change
prompted the pipeline company to stop buying gas, and the processor
sued on two grounds. First, the plaintiff claimed the pipeline company
breached the processing contract because it failed to act in good faith
under section 1.203 of the Code by canceling its purchasing contracts with
gas producers. 9 Second, section 2.306 of the Code governing output con-
tracts requires the pipeline company to continue purchasing gas for com-
pression by the processor10 The court held that the duty of good faith
stated in section 1.203 of the Code does not create an independent cause
of action. Rather, the duty of good faith is simply a way of measuring a
party's performance under a contract otherwise governed by the Code."1
Thus, the pipeline company's good faith might be relevant in measuring
its performance. However, the pipeline company had no independent
duty to act in good faith. As to the application of section 2.306, the court
ruled that the gas processing contract was a service contract and not a
sales contract because the processor did not buy the gas.12 The processor
merely compressed the gas for transport through the pipeline. Because
the processing contract was a service contract and not a contract for the
sale of goods, the court refused to "import into the Agreement a require-
ment from the Code's sales article. ' 13 The only remaining question was
whether there was an implied common law duty that required the pipe-
line company to continue purchasing gas for processing. On this point,
the court's opinion is curious. In what turned out to be its first opinion in
this case (Northern I), the court, in an 8-0 decision, held that there was no
such duty and rendered a take nothing judgment against the processing
company.14 After granting a rehearing, however, the court reversed its
direction in a second opinion (Northern II), withdrew its opinion in
8. 986 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1998).
9. Section 1.203 of the Code provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this title
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1994).
10. Sections 2.306(a) and (b) require that quantities tendered or demanded in sales
contracts be such quantities as occur in good faith and that sellers and buyers in exclusive
dealing contracts use best efforts to supply or promote the goods. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.306(a), (b) (Vernon 1994).
11. See Northern Natural Gas, 986 S.W.2d at 606.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 607. The court reached this conclusion despite a clause in the contract pro-
viding that it "'shall be interpreted in accordance with the rules of construction and inter-
pretation set forth in the Texas Uniform Commercial Code."' Id. at 603 (quoting the
parties' agreement on natural gas processing and transportation).




Northern I, and, again by an 8-0 decision, held that a common law duty of
good faith should be imposed on output and requirements contracts.'15
The court remanded the case for a new trial in which the processor could
"attempt to prove that [the pipeline company] canceled its gas purchase
contracts without a valid business reason and in bad faith.' 6
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas Co., 17 the court applied
the Code standard of good faith to the modification of a "take-or-pay"
gas sales contract. To determine if the contract modification had been
obtained in bad faith, the court considered: (1) whether the modification
was sought for legitimate commercial reasons; (2) whether the modifica-
tion was obtained by extortionate means; and (3) whether agreement to
the modification was obtained by trickery, artifice, or misrepresenta-
tion.18 In reviewing these factors, the court concluded that the evidence
supported the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of the defend-
ant.19 The court also held, however, that the evidence supporting a find-
ing of bad faith was insufficient to support a finding of unconscionable
action by the defendant. 20 On this point the court noted that "the theo-
ries of unconscionability and good faith/bad faith ... are distinct .... [I]t
may be that the existence of bad faith may be weighed in determining
whether someone acted unconscionably, but it alone does not establish
unconscionability."21
The question of good faith also figured in the case of Eller v. Nation-
sBank of Texas, N.A. 22 in which the court held that the relationship be-
tween a bank and a depositor was merely that of debtor and creditor and
did not rise to the level of a special relationship giving rise to a duty of
good faith on the part of the bank. In reaching its decision, the court
rejected a contrary holding, that a special relationship giving rise to a
duty of good faith exists between a bank and its depositors in Plaza Na-
tional Bank v. Walker.23 This rejection was posited on the ground that
Plaza had been "implicitly overruled" 24 by the decision in Formosa Plas-
tics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers & Contractors., Inc.25 in which the
Texas Supreme Court held that a duty of good faith does not arise in
ordinary commercial dealings.26
15. See Northern, 986 S.W.2d at 603.
16. Id.
17. 964 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. granted).
18. See id. at 67-68.
19. See id. at 70.
20. See id. at 74 n.3.
21. Id.
22. 975 S.W.2d 803, 809 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet. h.).
23. 767 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
24. Eller, 975 S.W.2d at 809.
25. 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
26. See id. at 52. In Eller, a depositor was suing a bank for the loss of money and
valuables the depositor had allegedly put in a safe deposit box. The court upheld the valid-
ity of a release clause contained in the contract under which the box was leased against
claims of negligence, deceptive trade practices, and breach of a warranty of habitability.
See Eller, 975 S.W.2d at 808-09. The court remanded the case, however, on the one claim
that had not been addressed by the bank in its motion for summary judgment, namely,
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C. ACCELERATION & USURY
In Star Food Processing, Inc. v. Killian,27 the court held that a waiver
clause did not effectively waive the right to notice of acceleration because
the waiver clause did not "clearly and unequivocally" waive such notice
under the Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp.2 8 standards. The Shumway
court required separate waivers of a notice of acceleration and a notice of
intent to accelerate. 29 Because the debtor had not waived notice of accel-
eration, the remittance of a late installment payment, made before notice
of acceleration was received, caused an attempted acceleration to be inef-
fective and resulted in a take nothing judgment against the creditor in the
creditor's action to collect the accelerated balance of the note.30
In Coastal Cement Sand v. First Interstate Credit,3 1 the court held that a
claimed savings clause was actually only a severability clause that, by its
own terms, applied only to security agreements executed as part of the
transaction and not to the promissory notes executed as part of the same
transaction. Because the terms of the clause did not apply to the notes
and did not expressly disclaim an intention to collect unearned interest
upon acceleration, the court held that the notes were usurious on their
face.32
In addition to problems arising from the inclusion of unearned interest
when a note is accelerated, mistakes in calculation may result in usurious
charges. For example, in Oyster Creek Financial Corp. v. Richwood In-
vestments II, Inc.,33 a note originally held by a savings and loan was ac-
quired by the RTC and subsequently sold to a bank. While the bank held
the note, Richwood defaulted, and the bank gave written notice of de-
fault and private foreclosure. The notice stated that the balance due, in-
cluding interest, was approximately $1.2 million. Before private
foreclosure actually commenced, however, the note was sold again to an
investment trust for $1.17 million (ninety-five percent of the claimed bal-
ance due). A few days later, the investment company notified the debtor
that the balance due, including interest, was $1.6 million ($400,000 more
than the amount stated by the bank). The notice did not itemize the ele-
ments that went into this total. When the debtor questioned this amount,
he was told that the bank had used the wrong maturity date in its calcula-
breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in the rental of a safe
deposit box. See id. at 810. The court noted that it did not express any opinion on the
viability of this claim, but merely held that the bank had failed to address the claim in its
motion for summary judgment. See id. at 808-09. Although not mentioned in the opinion,
arguably the lease of a safe deposit box is a lease of personal property governed by Chap-
ter 2A of the Code and carries with it the implied warranties stated in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 2A.212 & .213 (Vernon 1994), and any disclaimer of warranties must com-
ply with TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.214 (Vernon 1994).
27. 954 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
28. 801 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1991).
29. See id. at 894-95.
30. See Star Food Processing, 954 S.W.2d at 127.
31. 956 S.W.2d 562, 576 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
32. See id. at 572.
33. 957 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. denied).
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tions and that the attorney for the investment company had recalculated
the amount due. The debtor refused to pay the new amount on the
ground of usury and sued to enjoin foreclosure. The court consolidated
the countersuit by the investment company.
The debtor sought to obtain the calculations made by the investment
company attorney to determine the basis for the increase in the amount
due. However, the trial court ruled the calculations were the attorney's
work product and quashed a subpoena duces tecum obtained by the
debtor.34 Evidence of the calculations was ruled inadmissible at trial.35
On appeal, the court held that the calculations had been made to effect a
private foreclosure and not in preparation for litigation.36 Because the
calculations were, therefore, not work product protected by the attorney-
client privilege, they were fully discoverable and should have been admit-
ted by the trial court. 37 The case was remanded for a new trial on the
debtor's claim.38
In Pentico v. Mad-Wayler, Inc.,39 the creditor included nearly eleven
thousand dollars in late charges as part of its claim. When the debtor
challenged this inclusion, the creditor admitted that the charges were "er-
roneous" but did not attempt to show that the miscalculation was the
result of an accidental and bona fide error. The court held that "[m]erely
brushing the miscalculation aside as 'erroneous' and presenting argu-
ments based on the correct figure does not establish that the issue is set-
tled as a matter of law.' '4 ) On remand, absent a showing of accidental
and bona fide error, the late charges were to be treated as interest and a
determination made if the amount made the creditor's claim usurious
under the spreading doctrine.41 Denial of the creditor's motion for sum-
mary judgment was affirmed.42
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap, A.S. v. Hydrocarbon Processing,
Inc.,43 two companies entered into contracts for the sale of propane
through a broker acting as agent for both parties. After both companies
34. See id. at 645.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 648.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 650.
39. 964 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
40. Id. at 713.
41. See id. at 716.
42. See id. at 719. Because the facts of this case arose while the Texas Credit Code was
still in effect, the opinion is based on various sections of TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069. However, the court was careful to provide parallel citations to the Texas Finance
Code adopted in 1997, which contains most provisions that were formerly in the Texas
Credit Code. See TEx. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 301.001 to 394.103 (Vernon 1998). This makes
the opinion a helpful current reference for some issues that arise in Texas usury litigation.
43. 992 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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notified the broker that the contract terms were acceptable, the broker
prepared, signed, and faxed copies of the contract to both parties. The
court held that each fax constituted "'a writing . . . signed by . . .[an]
authorized agent or broker"' within the terms of section 2.201. 44 The
court also noted that, even if the statute of frauds was not otherwise satis-
fied, the faxes operated as effective confirmations within the merchants'
exception. Both faxes began by saying, "[W]e are pleased to confirm the
following transactions. '45 Since neither party was required to respond, or
to do anything further in regard to the transaction, the faxes met the re-
quirements of the merchants' exception in section 2.201.46
The statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule both figured in the
decision of J. Parra e Hijos, S.A. de C. V. v. Barroso47 in which the court
held that a written contract for the sale of goods satisfied the statute of
frauds and operated to bar introduction of evidence concerning an al-
leged personal guaranty by the principal shareholder of a corporate
buyer. The court also noted that section 26.01 of the Code provides a
separate statute of frauds requiring that promises to answer for the debt
of another must be in writing to be enforceable.48 Thus, both the parol
evidence rule and a separate statute of frauds requirement prevented the
introduction of evidence about the claimed personal guaranty.
B. WARRANTIES
Although it appeared that the doctrine of privity was laid to rest in
Texas several years ago in Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,49 the
decision of Hininger v. Case Corp.50 reincarnated privity concept in a
somewhat different form. The scope of the Hininger doctrine was consid-
44. Id. at 915 (referring to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (Vernon 1994)).
45. Id. at 916 (referring to the parties' agreement). The merchant's exception in TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 1994) provides that, as between merchants, a
confirming writing received by a party will satisfy the statute of frauds as against that party
if no objection is made to the contents of the writing within ten days after receipt.
46. See Den Norske, 992 F. Supp. at 916.
47. 960 S.W.2d 161, 167-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
48. See id. at 170. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1991) is a typical
example of statutes requiring guaranty contracts to be in writing.
49. 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977).
50. 23 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1994). For a thorough discussion of Hininger, see John
Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, SMU L. REv. 973,982-83 (1995). The Hininger court
held that, while a manufacturer of finished goods can be liable to remote purchasers for
economic losses caused by a breach of warranty, the rule should be otherwise for manufac-
turers of component parts. See Hininger, 23 F.3d at 128. The court reasoned that compo-
nent manufacturers, unlike manufacturers of finished goods, may not be able to effectively
disclaim warranties because their components simply become part of another product and
because their disclaimers of component warranties might not be communicated to the ulti-
mate purchasers of the finished products. See id. at 129. The court also noted that Texas
law does not permit the recovery of damages for economic loss on theories of strict liability
or negligence. See id. at 127-28. Such damages are recoverable, however, if personal injury
or property damage has resulted from the breach. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal
Oil Prod., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978). The development of Texas law in regard to the
recovery of damages for economic loss is discussed in William Powers, Jr. & Margaret
Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and the 'Economic Loss' Rule, 23 TEX. TEcH L.
REv. 477 (1992). The rule preventing recovery of damages for economic loss in a negli-
1999]
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ered in Metro National Corp. v. Dunham-Bush, Inc.5 1 in which a manu-
facturer of compressors made representations directly to a remote
purchaser, including a statement that the compressors were warranted for
five years. Because of these direct communications, the court held that
the compressor manufacturer was liable to the remote purchaser for
breach of express warranty when the compressors failed to function prop-
erly.52 The court reasoned that Hininger did not extend to a situation
where a component, available separately under its own brand name, was
a central element of the sale of a complete cooling system for a hospital
and the manufacturer actively encouraged use of its component in the
system. 53 The lack of contractual privity under these circumstances does
not bar claims for breach of either an express warranty or the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 54
In addition to its claim for breach of warranty, the buyer asserted a
claim of fraudulent inducement to enter the contract. As to this claim,
the court held that the buyer's damages could be measured in one of two
ways: (1) by the difference between the value paid and the value received
(out-of-pocket damages); or (2) by the difference between the value rep-
resented and the value received (benefit of the bargain damages). 55 The
court noted that these were the damage measures described in Formosa
Plastics in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a tort claim for
fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract was a proper cause of ac-
tion "irrespective of whether the promise is later subsumed within a con-
tract.'' 56 In regard to the choice between these two measures of damages,
the court in Metro pointed out that, while the usual measure of damages
for breach of warranty is expectation damages (benefit of the bargain
damages), section 2.714 of the Code allows use of another measure if
"'special circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount." 57 The court concluded that there were too many unknown fac-
tors to permit calculation of expectation damages with any reasonable
certainty and that a more appropriate measure of damages would be the
amount spent by the buyer in reasonable reliance on the breached war-
ranties (out-of-pocket damages).58 This conclusion means that damages
on the fraudulent inducement claim and the warranty claim were identi-
cal. However, the court recognized "that [the buyer's] warranty claim
entitles it to attorney's fees" and entered judgment on the warranty claim
gence action was applied during the Survey period in Indelco, Inc. v. Hanson Indus. N.
Am., 967 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
51. 984 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
52. See id. at 559.
53. See id. at 558-59.
54. See id. at 561.
55. See id. at 562.
56. Formosa Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 46.





instead of the fraud claim.59
In Church & Dwight Co. v. Huey,60 the court also considered the liabil-
ity of a remote manufacturer. In this case, the manufacturer was the
source of a finished product used as the active compound in a paint re-
moval system. Although it was not the seller of the removal system, the
manufacturer met directly with the remote purchaser to encourage acqui-
sition of the system and provided literature about the benefits of the re-
moval compound. After the compound failed to perform as represented,
the purchaser sued for breach of warranty and DTPA misrepresentations.
Because of the direct communication between the remote manufacturer
of the removal compound and the purchaser of the removal system, the
court held that both claims would lie despite the lack of contractual priv-
ity between the parties.61
In General Motors Corp. v. Brewer,62 the Texas Supreme Court held
that the need to detach and reattach seatbelts in a vehicle did not amount
to a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. On this point the
court stated that "a product which performs its ordinary function ade-
quately does not breach the implied warranty of merchantability merely
because it does not function as well as the buyer would like, or even as
well as it could."' 63
C. RISK OF Loss FOLLOWING DELIVERY
In Ojeda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,64 a buyer tried unsuccessfully to fit a
round peg into a square hole by asserting a Chapter 7 conversion claim
for misdelivery by a bailee in a Chapter 2 sales case involving delivery by
a seller. The plaintiff buyer, a retailer located in Mexico, ordered and
paid for a large quantity of hair spray from a Sam's Club located in the
United States. Following his usual practice for such orders, the buyer
hired a transfer agent to provide a trailer and loader to pick up the goods
and transport them through customs to the buyer's store in Mexico. The
transfer agent and the loader received the goods at Sam's warehouse on a
Friday and loaded them on a trailer for transportation to Mexico on the
following morning. Because a flat tire was discovered on the trailer on
Saturday, however, the trailer remained parked in a lot surrounding the
warehouse over the weekend. On Monday the driver discovered that the
trailer had been stolen. The buyer argued that Sam's had converted the
59. Id.
60. 961 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
61. See id. at 568-69. As to the DTPA claim, the court distinguished Amstadt v.
United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996), holding that upstream compo-
nent suppliers were not liable for DTPA violations if the alleged violations did not occur in
connection with the consumer transaction giving rise to the claim. Here, unlike Amstadt,
the component supplier met with the remote purchaser to promote the removal system and
provided literature about the removal compound used in the system directly to the
purchaser.
62. 966 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1998).
63. Id. at 57.
64. 956 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
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goods by breaching the duty of a bailee to deliver the goods to the proper
party. 65 The court rejected this argument because it viewed Sam's as a
seller of goods who had properly delivered them to the buyer on Friday
under a contract of sale rather than a bailee who had agreed to store the
goods over the weekend. After the loading was complete, the seller "had
nothing further to do with the goods."'66
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, GUARANTIES,
& BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENTS
Although decided under the prior version of Chapter 3 of the Code,
the decision by the Texas Supreme Court in Southwestern Resolution
Corp. v. Watson 67 showed a willingness to apply the liberalized standards
of the revised Chapter 3 of the Code governing negotiable instruments to
the affixation of an allonge to an instrument. 68 The court cited and dis-
cussed the relaxed requirements of the revised Chapter 3 and held that,
as a matter of law, attachment of an allonge by staples satisfied the affixa-
tion requirement. 69
In Ashcraft. v. Lockadoo,70 the court of appeals ruled, inter alia, that
assignment of a note did not carry with it an assignment of a guaranty
securing payment of the note. This ruling appears to be mere dicta, how-
ever, because the plaintiff was also unable to produce the original guar-
anty and was only able to introduce an unauthenticated photocopy that
the court held was insufficient to prove the plaintiff's ownership of the
guaranty. In a per curiam denial of a writ of error, the Texas Supreme
Court specifically noted that "the Court neither approves nor disapproves
of the court of appeals' discussion of whether the assignment of a promis-
sory note also operated as an assignment of a guaranty of that note."'71
Thus, the question of whether assignment of a note carries with it an as-
signment of an associated guaranty seems to be an open one in Texas.
65. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.403 (Vernon 1991).
66. Ojeda, 956 S.W.2d at 708. On this point, the court cited TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 1994) regarding the passage of title upon physical delivery of goods
to a buyer. Although not mentioned by the court, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.509(c) (Vernon 1994) provides an even clearer indication that the risk of loss passes to
a buyer upon delivery of the goods.
67. 964 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1997).
68. Chapter 3 of the Code was completely revised by the Act of May 28, 1995, 74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4582 (codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 3.101 -.605 (Vernon Supp. 1998)). The new Chapter 3 became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1996. See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
4582, 4643.
69. To similar effect, see Winfield v. Dosohs 1, Ltd., No. 01-97-00997-CV, 1998 WL
436895 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 30, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publica-
tion). The Winfield court held that an endorsement by the FDIC on a separate piece of
paper permanently attached to a note with glue was effective to transfer a promissory note
to a holder even though there was still room on the note for endorsements. See id. at *5.
70. 952 S.W.2d 907, 920 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997), pet. denied, per curiam, 977 S.W.2d
562 (Tex. 1998).




Under section 3.309 of the revised Chapter 3 of the Code, a person not
in possession of an instrument may still enforce it if: (1) the person was in
possession of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when possession
was lost; (2) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the
person seeking to enforce the instrument or the result of a lawful seizure
of the instrument; and (3) the person cannot obtain possession because
the whereabouts of the instrument are unknown, it has been destroyed,
or it is in the wrongful possession of a person who cannot be found or
reached by legal process. 72
In Geiselman v. Cramer Financial Group, Inc. ,73 the assignee of two
promissory notes acquired them from the FDIC and sought to recover on
them under the provisions of section 3.309 of the Code.74 Based on the
testimony of two witnesses, the trial court granted a summary judgment
in favor of the assignee. 75 The court of appeals reversed, noting that the
witnesses neither offered testimony accounting for the loss or destruction
of the original notes nor testified from personal knowledge that the as-
signee ever had possession of the notes or that copies of the notes were
true and correct copies of the original notes. 76 Because of these defects in
satisfying the elements required by the Code, the court held that sum-
mary judgment was improperly granted and remanded the case for a new
trial.77
In Geiselman, the court pointed out that Western National Bank. v.
Rives78 had previously discussed the possession requirement. Specifi-
cally, the Western National court said that in "recodifying the provision
under [section] 3.309 of the amended Code, [the legislature] declared that
'a person who is not in possession of an instrument is entitled to enforce'
it if he 'was in possession . . . and entitled to enforce it when loss...
occurred."' 79 In light of the revision and based on its reading of the prior
section 3.804 on lost instruments,80 the court of appeals in Western Na-
tional held that proof of possession was required, and this holding was
followed in Geiselman.81
72. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
73. 965 S.W. 2d 532 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
75. See Geiselman, 965 S.W.2d at 539.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 540.
78. 927 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
79. Id. at 685 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1996)).
80. See Act of May 25, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 785, § 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343,
2440, amended by Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
4582 (codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.101-.605 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
81. This apparent change in the requirements for recovering on lost instruments was
noted in Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broad. Corp., 977 F. Supp. 491, 494-95 (D.D.C.
1997), in which the court held that the assignee of a note that was apparently lost by the
FDIC prior to assignment of the note as part of an FDIC loan "package" could not recover
against the guarantors on the note because the plaintiff was not in possession of the note at
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C. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER
Under Chapter 3 of the Code, a holder in due course takes an instru-
ment free of many defenses that might otherwise be available to the
maker or drawer.82 Per contra, if a holder does not qualify as a holder in
due course, the holder remains subject to the claims and defenses of the
obligor.83 In World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc.,84 the court added an
interesting twist to these basic rules by holding that a provision in a note,
which requires a payee to give notice of default and an opportunity to
cure, does not apply to a holder of the note. The court reasoned that,
because section 1.102 of the Code 85 permits its effects to be varied by
agreement, the clause in question made the notice provision operative
only against the payee and that a subsequent holder, even one who was
not a holder in due course, was not bound to give notice of default before
seeking payment of the balance due on the note.86 According to the
court, the parties had agreed to give subsequent holders greater enforce-
ment rights than the payee had. 87
Although it now seems settled that a reasonable interest rate can be
substituted when a note calls for payment based on the prime rate of a
defunct bank, the note holder is still required to prove such a "reasonable
rate." In Commercial Services of Perry, Inc. v. Wooldridge,88 the court
held that a creditor's failure to prove a reasonable rate of interest to sub-
stitute for the prime rate of the failed bank prevented the creditor from
recovering on a note because the amount due and owing could not be
determined. The court rejected an argument that section 3.112 of the
Code 89 allows use of the judgment rate in lieu of proving a rate because
using the judgment rate would "in effect, be rewarding [the creditor] for
the time it was lost. Although the court recognized that there was no "logical reason to
distinguish between a person who was in possession at the time of the loss and one who
later comes into possession of the rights to the note," the statutory language of the revised
section 3.309 requires the plaintiff to show both possession of the note at the time of loss
and that the plaintiff was a person entitled to enforce the note when it was lost. Id. at 495.
To similar effect, see McKay v. Capital Resources Co., 940 S.W.2d 869 (Ark. 1997). In
Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Caddo Parish-Villas S., Ltd., 218 B.R. 851, 855 (N.D. Tex. 1998), how-
ever, the court held that an assignee could recover on a note lost by the assignor when the
assignment included an assignment of the right to recover on the note and when the as-
signor met all of the requirements of section 3.309, including the requirement of possession
at the time of loss.
82. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998). To qualify as
a holder in due course, the holder must meet the requirements stated in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE § 3.302(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
83. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
84. 977 S.W.2d 662, 679-80 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
85. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Vernon 1994).
86. See World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 677. In pertinent part, the clause in question read:
"[n]otwithstanding any other term or condition hereof, the Payee shall give the under-
signed (a) ten (10) days, after written notice ("Notice") that an event has occurred that
would be a monetary default hereunder.., to cure same before Payee declares a default
hereunder." Id.
87. See id.
88. 968 S.W.2d 560, 565-66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
89. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.112(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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its failure to prove its case." 90 The court held that section 3.112 was in-
tended to deal with cases where an instrument calls for the payment of
interest but is silent on the rate to be used. 9 1 A take-nothing judgment in
favor of the debtor was affirmed. 92
D. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND ARBITRATION
If the parties have included a broad arbitration clause in a note or in
associated agreements, the holder of the note may be bound by a dis-
charge of the maker in arbitration even if the holder was not a party to
the arbitration but had interests that were congruent with those of the
parties involved in the arbitration. In Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v.
Drago Daic Interests, Inc.,93 the court held that an arbitration award dis-
charging a purchaser of land from liability on a promissory note issued to
the land developer was binding on the noteholders even though they
were not parties to the arbitration because payment of the note was con-
ditioned on performance of the underlying development contract be-
tween the purchaser and the developer.
The same concept of a congruency of interests was applied to obligors
rather than holders in Nationwide of Bryan, Inc. v. Dyer.94 In Nation-
wide, the court held that an agreement to arbitrate was binding on a non-
signing party because the non-signer was a third-party beneficiary of a
retail installment contract signed by her husband to purchase a mobile
home for use as their homestead.95 As a third-party beneficiary, the
wife's claims against the seller of the mobile home for alleged defects in
the home were so closely connected with the husband's claims for the
same defects that the wife could not "pick and choose" which contract
provisions applied to her claims.96 An order to compel arbitration was
approved. 97
1. Ownership of Bank Accounts
In the case of an account established as a joint account, the Texas Pro-
bate Code provides a uniform deposit contract to designate the contrac-
tual relationship between the parties and the bank.98 In Allen v.
Wachtendorf,99 the court held that a signature card that used the statutory
contract language properly designated a certificate of deposit account as
a joint account with right of survivorship and that the survivor was enti-
90. Wooldridge, 968 S.W.2d at 565.
91. See id. (citing the State Bar UCC Committee Comment to TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.112 (Vernon Supp. 1998) and Bailey, Vaught, Robertson & Co. v. Reming-
ton lnvs., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ)).
92. See Wooldridge, 968 S.W.2d at 565.
93. 138 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1998).
94. 969 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1998, no pet.).
95. See id. at 520.
96. See id. at 520.
97. See id. at 522.
98. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A (Vernon Supp. 1998).
99. 962 S.W.2d 279, 283-84 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
tied to the funds in the account following the death of the other joint
owner.
IV. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST HONOR
In AIG Risk Management, Inc. v. Motel 6 Operating L.P.,110 a cus-
tomer who had obtained the issuance of several letters of credit sought a
temporary injunction against the beneficiary named in the letters of
credit to prevent the beneficiary from drawing on the credits until sixty
days after notice of any proposed future draw was given to the customer.
The court held that the customer had established a probable right to re-
cover funds already paid to the beneficiary because the beneficiary had
made previous draws on letters of credit established for one transaction
to pay bills arising under other transactions.' 01 The court further rea-
soned that the temporary injunction did not prohibit the beneficiary from
making draws based on the proper transaction. Therefore, the case was
not one arising under section 5.114 but, rather, one arising under the
common law.10 2 On this point, the court found that the customer had
established a probable right to recover because of a breach of contract by
the beneficiary, a likelihood of imminent harm, and irreparable injury. 113
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. CLASSIFICATION OF COLLATERAL
In the decision of In re Bonnema10 4 the court addressed the question of
how "capital retains," which are funds retained by agricultural coopera-
tives from the sale of members' products, should be classified under
Chapter 9 of the Code. l05 The two most likely possibilities were classifi-
100. 960 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
101. See id. at 308.
102. See id. at 306 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (Vernon 1994).
This section of the Code permits an injunction against payment on a letter of credit in
limited circumstances.).
103. See AIG Risk Management, 960 S.W.2d at 308-09. The court recognized that the
"independence principle" normally prohibits examination of the contract between a cus-
tomer and a beneficiary that underlies a letter of credit. In this case, however, the court
found that the independence principle did not apply because:
The instant case does not involve the issuer's obligation nor whether the is-
suer acted properly in honoring [the beneficiary's] draft .... It is, therefore,
necessary to look at the underlying agreement .... Reviewing the underly-
ing agreement does not violate the independence principle, which requires
that the terms of a letter of credit alone control whether payment is to be
made. Because payment in this case has already been made, the letter of
credit has served its purpose. The question remaining is whether [the benefi-
ciary] obtained payment under false pretenses, and to answer that question,
we must look at the agreement [between the customer and the beneficiary].
Id. at 308.
104. 219 B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
105. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.105, .106, .109, .115 (Vernon 1991 & Supp.
1998) contain an elaborate classification scheme for property used as collateral in a Chap-
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cation as "investment property" because the cooperative issued certifi-
cates to its members or classification in the catch-all category of "general
intangibles."'10 6 The certificates specifically and conspicuously stated that
they were non-transferable and were subject to redemption only by ac-
tion of the board of directors of the cooperative. The court held that the
capital retains were not "investment property" because, despite the exist-
ence of certificates, the capital retains were not "of a type dealt in or
traded on securities exchanges or securities markets" as required by sec-
tion 8.102 of the Code. 10 7 Since the only remaining category was that of
"general intangibles," the capital retains fell into that classification. From
the standpoint of the secured party who had taken a security interest in
the capital retains, however, a further difficulty remained vis-a-vis the
trustee in bankruptcy: What effect did the restraint on alienation stated
on the certificates have on the security interest? If the restraint was inef-
fective, the security interest was valid. If the restraint was effective, the
capital retains were property of the bankruptcy estate. On this issue, the
secured party argued that the terms of section 9.318108 made the restraint
ineffective.
The court disagreed, however, because the bankruptcy debtors' interest
in the capital retains was treated as a capital contribution under the by-
laws of the cooperative, and the debtor's interest was, therefore, an eq-
uity interest rather than a right to the payment of money.'0 9 Since the
cooperative was not an "account debtor" within the meaning of section
9.318, that section was inapplicable. Concommittantly, the restraint on
alienation was effective." 0 The net result was that the security interest
did not attach to the capital retains. The capital retains were property of
the debtors' bankruptcy estate.
B. CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION AND FUTURE ADVANCES
In the decision of In re Conte"' a secured party attempted to use a
cross-collateralization clause on an auto loan to secure a subsequent
credit card debt. While the court agreed that Texas permits the use of
cross-collateralization clauses, it also pointed out that such clauses are
limited to indebtedness that was reasonably within the contemplation of
ter 9 secured transaction. The proper method for perfecting a security interest is often
dependent on the classification of the collateral.
106. "Investment property" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(a)(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1998), and "general intangibles" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.106 (Vernon 1991).
107. In re Bonnema, 219 B.R. at 955 (referring to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 8.102(a)(15)(C)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
108. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318(d) (Vernon 1991) provides: "A term in any
contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment
of an account or prohibits creation of a security interest in a general intangible for money
due or to become due or requires the account debtor's consent to such assignment or
security interest."
109. See In re Bennema, 219 B.R. at 956.
110. See id.
111. 217 B.R. 767 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1998).
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the parties when the security agreement was signed.112 In reviewing the
relevant portions of the security agreement, the court concluded that the
parties did not intend the auto loan to secure a later unrelated credit card
debt because the cross-collateralization clause at issue appeared in small
print on the reverse side of the form and was not disclosed on the face of
the form unlike another cross-collateralization clause that was disclosed
concerning the use of account deposits as additional security. 1 3 Consid-
ering the transaction as a whole, the court held that the security interest
on the auto had been paid in its entirety and that the cross-collateraliza-
tion clause did not give the secured party a valid lien on the vehicle. 114
C. PROCEEDS
Under Chapter 9 of the Code, while proceeds can consist of anything
received by the debtor upon the sale, exchange, collection, or other dis-
position of collateral, In re Value-Added Communications, Inc." 5 points
out that use of equipment is not a "disposition of collateral" within the
meaning of the term "proceeds." As the court succinctly put it, "[i]f fruits
and products from the use of collateral were treated as proceeds, every
creditor with a security interest in equipment would have a security inter-
est in all items produced from the equipment as well as the revenues
earned by the equipment."'1 6 If the secured party had properly described
the products as collateral in its financing statement, such an arrangement
may have passed judicial muster. But the secured party omitted any such
description and the attempt to reach the products by recharacterizing
them as proceeds was denied.117
The time when a security interest attaches to proceeds of collateral can
be important for a variety of reasons. For example, section 9.306 of the
Code requires a secured party to act within specified periods of time to
continue a perfected security interest in certain forms of collateral such as
identifiable cash proceeds or proceeds acquired with cash proceeds." 8
An interesting twist on this issue of timing arose in the decision of In re
Rees" 9 in which a secured party claimed a perfected security interest in
the proceeds of the bankruptcy debtors' 1996 cotton crop insurance in-
demnity payment. Under regulations of the Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration (FCIC), which acts as a reinsurer of crop insurance issued by
private insurance companies, an assignment of the right to receive pay-
ment under a crop insurance policy must be filed with the FCIC to be
112. See id. at 770-71.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 771-72.
115. 139 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1998).
116. Id. at 546.
117. See id.
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(c) (Vernon 1991) provides a ten day period
of temporary perfection. But after the lapse of that time, the secured party may be re-
quired to take additional steps to continue the perfection.
119. 216 B.R. 551 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
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effective.120 Although the secured party had perfected its security inter-
est in the cotton crop and proceeds of the crop, it failed to file an assign-
ment of the right to receive payment under the crop insurance policy.
Because of the failure of their 1996 crop, the debtors received a crop
insurance payment and subsequently filed a Chapter 12 bankruptcy reor-
ganization plan. The debtors argued that the federal regulations pre-
empted application of Chapter 9 of the Code and prevented the secured
party from reaching the proceeds of the crop insurance. The secured
party contended that the regulations only prevented attachment of the
security interest to the right to receive payment but did not prevent at-
tachment of the security interest to the insurance proceeds themselves.
Based on a careful reading of the Federal Crop Insurance Act under
which the FCIC promulgated its regulations, the court ruled that the Act
only "prohibits liens on policy proceeds 'before payment to the insured"'
and does not prohibit a security interest in the policy proceeds them-
selves.' 21 The court held, in effect, that the scope of federal preemption
under the Act was very narrow and that the broader preemption found in
the regulations was essentially "boot-strapping" by the FCIC that did not
have a foundation in the statutory language. 122
In Phippen v. Deere & Co., 123 the secured party asserted a conversion
claim against the purchaser of the debtor's business when neither the
debtor nor the purchaser remitted all of the proceeds from inventory
sales that took place before the business was sold. The purchaser argued
that conversion would not lie because the proceeds had not been segre-
gated but had been deposited into the seller's operating account, com-
mingled with other funds, and spent by the seller. The court agreed with
the purchaser on this point, noting that an action for conversion lies for
the recovery of money only if the money can be identified as a specific
chattel.12 4 Fortunately for the secured party, however, he also had as-
serted claims for fraud, for money had and received, and for unjust en-
richment. On these claims, the court had no difficulty granting recovery
to the secured party because there was overwhelming evidence that the
seller and purchaser had conspired to conceal the proceeds of the inven-
tory sales and to avoid paying the secured party. 125
D. PRIORITIES
In Alan Acceptance Corp. v. East Texas National Bank of Palestine,126
the secured party successfully asserted a conversion claim against a com-
peting claimant who repossessed a variety of dental equipment from the
120. See 7 C.F.R. § 457.8, pt. 26 (1995).
121. In re Rees, 216 B.R. at 554 (emphasis added).
122. See id. at 555.
123. 965 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
124. See id. at 724.
125. See id. at 725.




debtor. The secured party had a valid and perfected security interest in
the equipment that came into existence before the transaction with the
second party occurred. Even if both security interests had been per-
fected, the first secured party would have prevailed. In this case, how-
ever, the court held there was "no evidence" that the debtor and the
second party had entered into a loan transaction or had even created a
security interest in favor of the second party. 27 Under these circum-
stances, the second party had no right to "repossess" the equipment and
the conversion claim was upheld. 128
In Franklin National Bank v. Boser,12 9 a bank made loans to a dairy
farmer during 1992 and 1993 that were secured by a security interest in all
of the debtor's dairy cattle, both then-owned and thereafter acquired.
The security interest was properly perfected by a filing in the office of the
Texas Secretary of State. In 1994 the farmer obtained an additional sixty
head of cattle from another person under a contract that was titled a
"lease purchase agreement." The lessor/seller also completed a UCC-1,
but, relying on advice from the county clerk's office and his familiarity
with the filing rules in his home state, the lessor/seller filed the financing
statement in the office of the county clerk where the dairy farm was lo-
cated within twenty days after the farmer received the cattle. In 1995 the
dairy farmer told the bank he was going out of the dairy business, and the
bank conducted a lien search in the Secretary of State's office. The
search revealed only the two financing statements filed by the bank in
1992 and 1993. The bank repossessed and sold all of the cattle, including
the sixty head acquired a year earlier. After learning of the repossession
and sale, the lessor/seller sued the bank contending that he had a superior
interest in the sixty cattle, either on the ground that his interest was
founded on a lease under which title to the cattle never passed to the
debtor or on the ground that he had priority because his interest in the
cattle was a purchase money security interest.
The court had no difficulty in declaring that the "lease purchase agree-
ment" was actually a security agreement regardless of what it was called
by the parties because it contemplated that, upon completion of the lease
payments, the lessee would become the owner of the cattle and the lessee
had no option to terminate the lease before the end of the lease term.130
The court held that, under section 1.201 of the Code, the economic reali-
ties of the transaction made the interest of the lessor nothing more than a
disguised security interest. 13' The more interesting question, however,
was whether filing by the seller in the wrong filing office would protect
the purchase money security interest against the bank's security interest
127. See id. at *2.
128. See id.
129. 972 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
130. See id. at 103.
131. See id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(37) (Vernon 1994) contains an elab-
orate definition of the factors to be considered in determining if a lease is a true lease or
merely a disguised security interest.
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in after-acquired property. The seller argued that section 9.401 of the
Code gave him priority because the filing was made in good faith and the
bank had knowledge of the contents of the financing statement by virtue
of the seller's claim to the cattle that he asserted after the repossession.132
On this issue, the court reasoned that section 9.401 was intended to pro-
tect good faith filings against subsequent lenders who knew of the con-
tents of improperly filed financing statements but was not intended to
protect later filings against prior lenders who had already properly
filed. 13
3
The only Texas precedent on a similar issue interpreted the operation
of section 9.401 in the context of a purchase money security interest in
inventory.134 Although not squarely on point, the Franklin National
Bank court was persuaded by the Borg-Warner court's reasoning and
chose to follow its interpretation. 135
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West136 concerned the
application of the special priority rule that arises in a construction context
when a contractor or subcontractor borrows money from a secured party
and grants a security interest in accounts receivable. If the contractor or
subcontractor defaults on its obligations under the construction contract
and a surety completes the work, is the secured party or the surety enti-
tled to any undisbursed progress payments? In general the courts have
held that the surety's rights to the proceeds are superior to the lender's
perfected security interest because the surety's right to equitable subroga-
tion is not a security interest subject to Chapter 9 of the Code. Therefore,
the lender does not gain priority over the surety by perfecting a security
interest in the proceeds. 137
In State Bank & Trust, however, the court held that this general rule
does not prevent a secured party from claiming a superior right to tangi-
132. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.401(b) (Vernon 1994).
133. See Franklin Nat'l Bank, 972 S.W.2d at 105. The court summarized its position in
the following terms:
Even if the good faith filing section would otherwise apply in this case, sec-
tion 9.401(b) obviously contemplates that the "knowledge" of the contents of
the misfiled financing statement must be knowledge that the competing se-
curity interest holder had at the time he acquired his security interest. To allow
subsequent knowledge to trigger the good faith exception would render the
knowledge requirement meaningless, because in every case the competing
security interest holder would at some point, i.e., at foreclosure, suit, or
whenever the conflict arose, have knowledge of the other security interest.
Here, [the bank] did not have any knowledge of [the seller's] interest when it
took its interests, because [the seller's interest] was not in existence.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
135. See Franklin Nat'l Bank, 972 S.W.2d at 105. The conflicting cases cited by the
court were: Community Nat'l Bank v. Moyer, 836 P.2d 1198 (1992); Temporaries, Inc. v.
Maryland Nat'l Bank, 626 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (D. Md. 1986); and In re Johnson, 28 B.R.
292, 297 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
136. 132 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 1997).
137. See, e.g., Interfirst Bank Dallas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 774 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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ble collateral, such as equipment and materials owned by the contractor.
This is because the interest in the tangible collateral is not dependent on
the contractor's right to receive payment by completion of the
contract.
38
E. REPOSSESSIONS, RESALES, & FORECLOSURES
While issues of perfection, proceeds, and priorities are significant in
creating and enforcing a security interest, the chickens often come home
to roost when the debtor defaults and the secured party must take steps
to repossess and dispose of the collateral. Between the "indelegable
duty" rule of MBank El Paso v. Sanchez 39 and the "absolute bar" rule of
Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.140 the secured party must
tread carefully while carrying the weight of the burden of proof imposed
by Greathouse v. Charter National Bank-Southwest.14 1
The secured party slipped from this path in Milliorn v. Finance Plus,
Inc.142 by failing to give a required notice of public sale for the nonjudi-
cial foreclosure of a collateral note secured by real estate. The court held
that failure to perform the foreclosure sale in a commercially reasonable
manner prevented the secured party from recovering a deficiency on a
$320,000 note under the absolute bar rule of Tanenbaum.143 Whether by
luck or by design, however, not all was lost for the secured party because
the same debtor had executed a series of notes, and the notice of foreclo-
sure sent to the debtor did not list a separate $38,000 note secured by the
same collateral. As to this note, the court held that the secured party was
still entitled to recover a judgment for the balance due because the note
was not involved in the commercially unreasonable foreclosure sale.144
The court summarized its reasoning by stating, "Our holding penalizes
the creditor in accordance with Tanenbaum... on the one loan and one
138. See State Bank & Trust, 132 F.3d at 207. As stated by the court:
[Wjhen tangible personal property-distinct from contract proceeds-is at
issue, the rationale for elevating the surety over the secured creditor has no
application. Unlike the contractor's inchoate or potential rights in the con-
tract proceeds, the contractor comes into the construction contract with pres-
ent and effective ownership and the right to possess and use its own tools,
equipment, and inventory. If the contractor has previously given a creditor a
security interest in these materials- -even those subsequently acquired-the
creditor's right to realize on its collateral is not contingent on the contractor's
full performance of its obligations. As the creditor's interest in its tangible
collateral is not derivative of the contractor's right to collect payment under
its contract, the surety cannot claim an equitable right to possess and use its
defaulted principal's construction materials to complete the project that the
surety has bonded. In fact, granting such use at no cost would result in a
windfall to the surety, who would thus avoid the anticipated expense of pro-
viding materials necessary for project completion.
Id.
139. 836 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992).
140. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
141. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
142. 973 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.).
143. See id. at 692.
144. See id. at 693.
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item of collateral. It does not reward the defaulting debtor by providing
a windfall avoidance of personal liability on all loans owed to the
creditor."145
In Vera v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc.,'1 4 6 a father made arrangements
to purchase a car for his son. After the buyer made a downpayment and
took delivery of the car, the car dealer discovered that the buyer had
provided incorrect financial information on the purchase application.
The dealer demanded return of the car and tendered a refund of the
buyer's downpayment by sending a check to the buyer. The back of the
check included language indicating that, by cashing the check, the buyer
released the seller from all claims arising from the purchase of the car.
The buyer endorsed and cashed the check, but refused to return the car
and the dealer repossessed the vehicle. The buyer and his son both sued
the dealer for conversion, unlawful debt collection, wrongful reposses-
sion, and Deceptive Trade Practice Act (DTPA) violations. The court
held that the release was effective to waive all of the buyer's claims relat-
ing to the purchase of the car.1 47 The court further held, however, that
the release did not waive a separate claim by the son for conversion of
personal property that was allegedly in the vehicle when it was repos-
sessed. 148 The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of
the son's claim.
In Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Stewart,1 4 9 the court held that a senior
secured party was not liable to a junior secured party for selling a de-
faulted note to a maker of a collateral note nor for the subsequent fore-
closure of the realty securing the collateral note. The convoluted
situation arose from a series of transactions that began with the sale of
realty by the junior secured party (who was then the original owner of the
realty). The seller financed part of the sale by retaining a purchase
money lien, but this interest was subordinate to a first lien in favor of a
savings association. The purchaser of the realty later sold its interest to a
joint venture, and the joint venture issued a promissory note in partial
payment of the purchase price. This note was endorsed and collaterally
assigned to the savings association, and the original seller of the realty
was given another promissory note by the first purchaser secured by a
second lien in the joint venture note. By letter, the savings association
acknowledged the second lien status of the original owner and agreed
that it would act as bailee for him. At this point, time passed, and,
through a series of assignments and bank failures, the notes came to rest
in the hands of a bank. By this time the joint venture defaulted on its
note, resulting in the default of the maker on the notes issued by the first
purchaser to the original owner and to the savings association (this latter
note was now in the hands of the bank). The bank initiated collection of
145. Id.
146. No. 04-96-00749-CV, 1998 WL 484716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 19, 1998).
147. See id at *4.
148. See id. at *6.
149. 967 S.W.2d 419, 439 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
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the first purchaser's note. After a series of attempts to restructure the
obligation, and, after a bankruptcy reorganization plan proved unsuccess-
ful, the bank sold the first purchaser's note to one of the makers of the
joint venture note and assigned its interest in the collateral joint venture
note to the same maker (this party to the joint venture had withdrawn
from the venture some two years before). The maker then purchased the
collateral note by foreclosing on the original purchaser's note and subse-
quently foreclosed on the realty, thus terminating the interest of the jun-
ior secured party who was the original seller.
The junior party sued the bank, the joint venture maker who had ac-
quired the notes and realty, and the joint venture, asserting claims for
conversion, breach of the bailment agreement, breach of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing, violation of Code duties of reasonable care of col-
lateral and commercially reasonable disposition of collateral, fraud, and
tortious interference with the business relationship between the bank and
the junior secured party. The court found in favor of the bank on all
issues noting: (1) the bailment agreement only operated to perfect the
junior secured party's interest in the collateral note and was not breached
by the bank; 150 (2) the junior secured party was not a debtor to the bank
and the bank did not owe a duty of reasonable care to him under section
9-207;151 (3) the duty of good faith and fair dealing under section 1-203 of
the Code did not create an independent cause of action and there was no
breach of a contract nor any "special relationship" that would support
such a claim;' 52 (4) there was no evidence of fraud showing an intention
by the joint venture not to perform its obligations on the collateral note
at the time the note was issued;153 (5) because of its withdrawal from the
joint venture, the acquiring maker did not convert and did not interfere
with the business relationship between the junior secured party and the
bank; 154 and (6) although there was evidence that the sale of the collat-
eral note was not commercially reasonable, there was no loss to the junior
secured party because the jury found that the value of the collateral note
was less than the amount of the debt remaining on the unpaid note issued
by the first purchaser; thus, even a commercially reasonable sale would
not have yielded any proceeds to apply to the claim of the junior secured
party.' 55 A take nothing judgment was rendered against the junior se-
cured party in favor of all defendants.' 56
150. See id. at 434-35.
151. See id. at 438-39 (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.207 (Vernon
1991)).
152. See Stewart, 967 S.W.2d at 441-42. The duty of good faith is more fully discussed in
the text at note 7, supra.
153. See id. at 445.
154. See id. at 449.
155. See id. at 453-54.
156. See id. at 456.
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